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RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS (SECOND)-A REJECTION
OF NOMINAL CONSIDERATION?
INTRODUCTION
Restatement of Contracts § 84, illustration 1 (1932):
A wishes to make a binding promise to his son B to convey to B
Blackacre, which is worth $5000. Being advised that a gra-
tuitous promise is not binding, A writes to B an offer to sell
Blackacre for $1. B accepts. B's promise to pay $1 is suffi-
cient consideration.
Restatement of Contracts (Second) § 75, illustration 5 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1965) :
A desires to make a binding promise to give $1000 to his son B.
Being advised that a gratuitous promise is not binding, A offers
to buy from B for $1000 a book worth less than $1. B accepts
the offer knowing that the purchase of the book is a mere pre-
tense. There is no consideration for A's promise to pay $1000.
A generation of lawyers has been told that Blackacre may be "sold"
for one dollar. Perhaps on the theory that one generation of misinformed
lawyers is enough, the authors of the tentative draft of the Restatement
of Contracts (Second) propose a reversal of the venerable Blackacre-for-
a-dollar hypothetical. Although the factual contexts of the two above
quoted illustrations vary, the Reporter has made his Committee's inten-
tion clear by stating that the "only difference" is that "instead of the
promise being binding, the promise is said now to be not binding."' The
proposed change may not be criticized on the ground that it violates
Restatement objectives by departing from rules based on existing preced-
ents. To the contrary, the Reporter's position is that precedents are lack-
ing to support the Blackacre illustration.2 Since one of the functions of
a "Tentative Draft" is to invite criticism and suggestion by bar associa-
tions and the profession generally, it is appropriate to examine the aca-
demic commentary and the case law background of the doctrine of nomi-
nal consideration.
1. ALI PROCEEDINGS 251 (1965).
2. Ibid.
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Two preliminary comments regarding other statements on consider-
ation in the tentative draft may be helpful in understanding the context
of the proposed change.
The first comment is that the Restatement (Second) does not use
the phrase "sufficient consideration."'  In the first Restatement "consid-
eration" was used to refer to the element of exchange without regard to
any legal consequences. The adjective "sufficient" was used to express
the conclusion that the consideration requirement for an enforceable bar-
gain was satisfied.' The Restatement (Second) proposes to use the word
"consideration" to refer to an element of exchange sufficient to satisfy
the legal requirement.' "Sufficient" would therefore be redundant.'
The second comment concerns the change in the organization of the
sections defining and qualifying the doctrine of consideration. In the
first Restatement, section 84 qualified the doctrine as defined in section
75. The Restatement (Second), however, places the qualifying materials
in the same section as the definition.7 Consequently, illustration 1 to old
section 84 is now illustration 5 to new section 75.' Remnants of nominal
consideration are dealt with by the Restatement (Second) in section 89.
These remnants are the option and guaranty contracts which are not, in
reality, the nominal consideration of illustration 5 to section 75.'
THE ACADEMIC CONTROVERSY
The academic world remains divided on the question whether nomi-
nal consideration should be sufficient to enforce a promise. Professor
Fuller describes two main classes of objections to enforcing all promises.
The first class contains objections of "substance" which relate to the na-
ture of the promise and to its effects.' The second class contains objec-
tions of "form" which relate to the manner in which the promise was
made without referring to the content of the promise itself." According
to Professor Fuller, the requirements of form serve three functions.
These are: (1) evidentiary, (2) cautionary, and (3) channeling." Ap-
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONTRACTS § 75, comment a (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1965) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
4. Ibid.
5. Id. §§ 19, 75, comment a.
6. Id. § 75, comment a.
7. ALI PROCEEDINGS 250 (1965).
8. Id. at 250-51.
9. Id. at 251 and see text accompanying notes 43-52 infra.
10. FULLER & BRAUCHER, BASIC CONTRACT LAW 148 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
FULLER & BRAUCHER].
11. Ibid.
12. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUm. L. REv. 799, 806 (1941).
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plying this analysis to the doctrine of nominal consideration, Professor
Fuller writes:
The proper ground for upholding these decisions [enforcing a
promise given for nominal consideration] would seem to be that
the desiderata underlying the use of formalities are here satis-
fied by the fact that the parties have taken the trouble to cast
their transaction in the form of an exchange."3
According to Professor Fuller, form provides a means for a party to give
a "legally effective expression of intention."' 4
The theory that there is a close resemblance between the policies
underlying form and those underlying consideration is a "misconception"
according to Professor Havighurst." After stating that the courts usu-
ally do not enforce a contract for nominal consideration, he argues:
[H]owever informal the expressions and however unconscious
the parties may be of their legal significance, if consideration
is present as a natural element in the transaction, it suffices.
Certainly this does not suggest that the reasons for the require-
ments of consideration and of form are similar.'
It would seem that form, of any type in any situation, does emphasize to
some extent the seriousness of an act to the party doing the act. But then
a question which goes beyond "form" is asked by Professor Patterson:
Even if such a red-light formality were found or invented,
would we not have to ask the promisee to show some additional
reason, other than his mere expectation, why the promisor's de-
fault and unwillingness to pay damages should entitle the
promisee to recover damages ?"1
The above question posed by Professor Patterson brings forth the
substantive issues involved in the nominal consideration question. Pro-
fessor Fuller writes with regard to these issues:
The attitude which our courts take toward private agree-
ments rests upon a kind of tacitly accepted constitution, which
has as one of its basic articles the principle of private autonomy.
This constitution, like that which regulates the relation of the
13. Id. at 820.
14. Id. at 801.
15. Havighurst, Consideration, Ethics and Adininistration, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6
(1942).
16. Ibid.
17. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUm. L. REV. 929, 943 (1958).
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courts to statutes, is, however, a complex document, the provi-
sions of which do not promote a single policy, but a congeries
of policies."8 (Emphasis added.)
This principle of private autonomy views private individuals as having
the power to bring about changes in their legal relations, and views the
court which enforces the promise, as simply giving legal sanction to rights
and duties already established by the parties. 9
The principle of private autonomy which allows a party to make a
binding expression of his intention is rejected by Professor Patterson
who states:
To say . . . that a contract is binding upon a party because it
expressed his will, is wholly inadequate because it does not ex-
plain why he may not will today the exact opposite of what he
willed yesterday.2"
As is shown by the above statement, nominal consideration has been at-
tacked because intent alone is believed not to be a sufficient reason to en-
force a contract and that, therefore, the courts should look for something
more. Professor Corbin states:
Serious intent is not a very definite concept; and it is not iden-
tical with intention to be legally bound ...
The chief purpose underlying the law of contract is not to
carry out the will of the promisor, although that may be one of
many purposes. It is believed that the chief purpose of enforce-
ment is the avoidance of disappointment and loss to the promi-
see. It is the reasonable expectation of the promisee (or bene-
ficiary) that the law chiefly takes into account . ...
One wonders what the reasonable expectation of the promisee of a nomi-
nal consideration contract, which basically is a gratuitous promise decor-
ated by form, really is. When it seems that we are getting something
for nothing, we ask "what's the catch ?" It is arguable that if this skep-
ticism is commonly experienced under circumstances similar to those
above described, we really have no reasonable expectation of receiving
anything of value.
Professor Cohen speaks on the root problem of the relationship be-
tween the courts and the enforcement of promises as follows:
18. FULLER & BRAUCHER 150.
19. Fuller, supra note 12, at 806.
20. PATTERSON, JURISPRUDENCE, MEN AND IDEAS OF THE LAW 461 (Ist ed. 1953).
21. 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 112, at 497 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CORBIN].
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Contract law is commonly supposed to enforce promises.
Why should promises be enforced?
The simplest answer is that of the intuitionists, namely,
that promises are sacred per se, that there is something inher-
ently despicable about not keeping a promise, and that a properly
organized society should not tolerate this. . . . But while this
intuitionist theory contains an element of truth, it is clearly in-
adequate. No legal system does or can attempt to enforce all
promises. Not even the canon law held all promises to be sa-
cred and when we come to draw a distinction between those
promises which should be and those which should not be en-
forced, the intuitionist theory, that all promises should be kept,
gives us no light or guiding principle.
* ' . It is indeed very doubtful whether there are many
who would prefer to live in an entirely rigid world in which
one would be obliged to keep all one's promises instead of the
present viable system, in which a vaguely fair proportion is
sufficient.22
Provisions in the Uniform Written Obligations Act" would author-
ize the enforcement of all writings containing a statement to the effect
that the signer intends to be legally bound. With regard to this form
and the enforcement of all promises, it has been said:
What the Uniform Written Obligations Act proposes . . . is
very close to the proposition that all promises should be enforced
unless there is some reason for not doing so. The requirement
of formality is a little more than mere evidence that words were
uttered, for it goes beyond the writing alone. But it is hardly
more than evidence that the words were intended to be a
promise ...
There is no sound a priori reason for assuming that all as-
surances intended to be promises should be enforced.2 4
Without this sound a priori reason, a court, in rendering a decision on the
enforceability of a promise, should advance some social interest" which
22. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553, 572-74 (1933).
23. The Uniform Written Obligations Act was adopted in Pennsylvania in 1927
[Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 33, §§ 6-8 (1949)] and in Utah from 1929 to 1933. Keyes, Cause and
Consideration in California-A Re-Appraisal, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 74, 86 (1959).
24. Hays, Consideration: A Legislative Program, 41 COLUm. L. REV. 849, 852
(1941).
25. Ibid.
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conforms to ethical standards of that society." Professor Havighurst
answers the question "what are these standards" by saying:
Subsequent occurrences affecting the question are the change of
position by the promisee in reliance on the promise, events which
affect the ability of the promisor to perform, changes in the
situation which induced the promise, circumstances defeating
the promisor's expectations, and the promisee's part in bring-
ing about the circumstances.
Ethical judgments with respect to the duty of perform-
ance will be the resultant of all these factors, and only in ex-
treme instances will the presence of one of them in any specified
degree be determinative. Thus an intervening event making
the promisor less able to carry out the promise might be ad-
judged as relieving him from the moral duty to perform if
little or nothing had been received in exchange for the promise,
whereas the same event would not be regarded as so relieving
him if he had received something of value. A man who suffers
a severe financial reverse may still be regarded as morally
bound to pay his grocer, but under no duty, ethically speaking,
to fulfill a pledge to his alma mater."
Judicial recognition of ethical norms thus weakens, if not destroys, the
desirability of nominal consideration."
As evidenced by the Blackacre illustration, the doctrine of nominal
consideration is used to avoid the delivery requirement of gift law. Pro-
ponents of nominal consideration may argue, however, that the purpose
of the delivery requirement is to satisfy cautionary, channeling, and
evidentiary interests. Since casting a gift into the form of a bargain
serves these particular interests, such formalization should be accepted
as a satisfactory substitute for delivery. This argument, however, does
not persuade those who contend that the gift is a sterile transaction:
When one receives a naked promise and such promise is broken,
he is no worse off than he was. He gave nothing for it, he has
lost nothing by it, and on its breach he has suffered no damage
cognizable by courts. No benefit accrued to him who made the
promise, nor did any injury flow to him who received it. Such
promises are not within the scope of transactions intended to
confer rights enforceable at law. 9
26. Havighurst, supra note 15, at 11.
27. Id. at 12.
28. Note, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 1090, 1097 (1935).
29. Davis & Co. v. Morgan, 117 Ga. 504, 507, 43 S.E. 732, 733 (1903).
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Another argument presented in support of nominal consideration
states that nominal consideration is desirable since the doctrine over-
comes an unintended consequence which resulted from the abolishment
of the legal effect of the seal.3" That unintended result was the dis-
appearance of a way to make a gratuitous promise binding.31 The seal
was formally abolished after it had become a meaningless act due to the
liberalization of the requisites of the seal from wax impressions to mere
printed words. 2 It has been also suggested that legislatures in deciding
to abolish the seal requirement, may have desired to move away from
medieval formalism or may have concluded that the character of the seal
was inappropriate as a formality.3"
Professor Simpson in speaking of the Uniform Written Obligations
Act"4 states:
Legislative refusal to adopt this Act is based fundamentally
upon approval of consideration as the test of an enforceable
promise, a reluctance to extend the field of substitutes therefor,
and disagreement with the assumption that a gift promise where
made deliberately and with intent to be bound should be legally
enforceable. 5
There is an analogy between the "seal" and the Uniform Written Obliga-
tions Act, at least to the extent that legislatures control the effect of their
respective uses. The common problem concerns whether the intent of the
parties is a sufficient reason for enforcement of the promise by the state.
Professor Patterson's statement that "consideration . . . includes
not only a thing (promise or performance) that the promisor bargains
for, but also the process of bargaining for it"3 would receive added sup-
port if the Restatement (Second) is adopted with the proposed revisions.
Professor Patterson viewed the bargaining "process" as defined in sec-
tion 75 of the Restatement." However, the "bargained-for process" is
not defined in the Restatement and is weakened by section 84 which
sanctions nominal consideration." With the elimination of nominal
consideration from section 84, and the inclusion of a definition of "bar-
30. VON MEHREN, THE CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 500 n.25 (1957) ; Hays, supra note 24
at 850.
31. Ibid.
32. SIMPSON, CONTRACTS 123 (2d ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as SIMPSON].
33. Hays, supra note 24, at 849.
34. Note 23 supra.
35. SIMPSON 126.
36. Patterson, supra note 17, at 932.
37. Ibid.
38. See FULLER & BRAUCER 194, wherein the editors pose a problem suggesting the
inconsistency between the illustrations of section 84a and section 75.
et al.: Restatement of Contracts (Second)–A Rejection of Nominal Consider
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gained for," section 75 and the "process" have become the dominant
doctrine. When the process is applied to a promise to convey Blackacre
for one dollar, there is no consideration."9 The nominal consideration of
one dollar, whether delivered or not, is a pretense rather than a reality.4"
An inquiry into the bargaining process is not an inquiry into the
adequacy of consideration. Professor Corbin states: "The smallness of
the consideration may not make it insufficient to support the promise if
it was in fact bargained for and given in exchange."'" Determining the
existence of a bargain is precedent to any ruling on consideration as noted
by Professor Corbin: "Courts must first determine the fact of bargain
and agreed exchange before they can properly apply the rules of con-
sideration as a bargained exchange."4
CASE LAW SUPPORTS PROPOSED REVISIONS
Cases exist which enforce promises given for nominal consideration.
However, these decisions most often occur when other elements justify-
ing enforceability are present. The court in Lawrence v. McCalmont,"3 a
case involving a guaranty promise,44 stated:
A valuable consideration, however small or nominal, if
given or stipulated for in good faith, is, in the absence of fraud,
sufficient to support an action on any parol contract; and this
is equally true as to contracts of guaranty as to other contracts.
A stipulation in consideration of one dollar is just as effectual
and valuable a consideration as a larger sum stipulated for or
paid.4"
However, it seems to be assumed by courts in deciding guaranty cases
that the promisees have relied on the promises by advancing credit.4"
Another promise for nominal consideration often enforced is that
39. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 75, comment b.
40. See 1 CORBIN § 130, at 557.
41. Ibid.
42. Id. § 127, at 546.
43. 2 How. 426 (U.S.), 11 L. Ed. 326 (1844).
44. The promise in Lawrence v. McCahnont read:
In consideration of Messrs. J. & A. Lawrence having a credit with your house,
and in further consideration of one dollar paid me by yourselves, receipt of
which I hereby acknowledge, I engage to you that they shall fulfill the en-
gagements they have made and shall make with you .
Id. at 445-46, 11 L. Ed. at 333.
45. Id. at 452, 11 L. Ed. at 336.
46. See, e.g., Robertson v. Garvan, 270 Fed. 643 (D.C.N.Y. 1920); Bond v. John
V. Farwell Co., 172 Fed. 58 (6th Cir. 1909); Stone-Ordean-Wells Co. v. Helmer, 142
Minn. 263, 171 N.W. 924 (1919).
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which grants an option of lease or purchase." The court may sustain
such a promise since it is difficult to value a given option." What seems
to be a reason worthy of more credence is that an option is simply a de-
vice for making a business offer irrevocable. Thus, the apparent disparity
in the grant of a valuable option for one dollar lessens when the whole
transaction is considered.49 Although a lease option often recites nomi-
nal consideration in return for the lease itself,"0 more substantial benefits
are usually present in the form of royalties or rentals going to the lessor.5 '
If the consideration is nominal in fact-that is, not bargained for-then
no consideration has been given and the option giver has the power to
revoke.52
Deeds often are executed for a consideration of one dollar. The
nominal consideration of one dollar results in a problem when a claimant
to land under a deed received for nominal consideration seeks to prevail
as a bona fide purchaser, under a local recording act, over the holder of
a prior unrecorded conveyance received for a substantial consideration." '
The recording act usually will require a "valuable consideration" if a
claimant is to prevail. 4 In this connection, a Wisconsin court has said:
47. An example of a lease option is:
For and in consideration of one dollar (1.00) cash in hand paid the Superior
Oil Company agrees to rent or lease. . . . The consideration for this option
is that Lessee, W. F. Meder, agrees to pay to Superior Oil Company a monthly
rental . ..
Meder v. Superior Oil Co., 1 Miss. 814, 119 So. 318 (1928).
Purchase option:
For and in consideration of the sum of $1.00 to me in hand paid, the receipt
whereof is hereby acknowledged. I hereby grant an option . . . to purchase
for the sum of fourteen thousand and forty dollars the following described
land ...
Morrison v. Johnson, 148 Minn. 343, 344, 181 N.W. 945 (1921).
48. Marsh v. Lott, 8 Cal. App. 384, 97 Pac. 163 (1908).
49. See Axe v. Tolbert, 179 Mich. 556, 146 N.W. 418 (1914) ; SimPsoN 85; Note,
35 COLUM. L. REV. 1090 (1935).
50. E.g., Guffey v. Smith, 237 U.S. 101 (1914); Lindlay v. Roydure, 239 Fed.
928 (E.D. Ky. 1917), aff'd, 249 Fed. 675 (6th Cir. 1918).
51. Ibid.
52. 2 CORBIN § 263, at 501. See Murphy, Thompson & Co. v. Reid, 125 Ky. 585,
101 S.W. 964 (1907) (dictum) ; Bailey v. Grover, 237 Mich. 548, 213 N.W. 137 (1927)
text accompanying notes 5-10 supra.
53. E.g., Davis v. Kleindienst, 64 Ariz. 251, 169 P.2d 78 (1946) ; Smith County Oil
Co. v. Jefcoat, 203 Miss. 404, 33 So. 2d 629 (1948).
54. E.g., N.Y. Real Property Law § 291:
A conveyance of real property within the state, on being duly acknowl-
edged by the person executing the same, or proved as required by this chapter,
and such acknowledgment or proof duly certified when required by this chap-
ter, may be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county where such real
property is situated, and such county clerk shall, upon the request of any party,
on tender of the lawful fees therefor, record the same in his said office. Every
such conveyance not so recorded is void as against any person who subsequently
purchases or acquires by exchange or contracts to purchase or acquire by ex-
change, the same real property or any portion thereof, or acquires by assignment
et al.: Restatement of Contracts (Second)–A Rejection of Nominal Consider
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[N]or does a mere nominal consideration satisfy the require-
ment that a valuable consideration must be paid. Its [the stat-
ute] purpose is to protect the man who honestly believes he is
acquiring a good title and who invests some substantial sum in
reliance on that belief.
The fact that the supposed title could be and was purchased
for a mere nominal consideration is certainly constructive no-
tice of the invalidity of the title, and sufficient of itself to put
the purchaser upon inquiry."
Deeds have been executed for a dollar when the earlier deed was void for
some reason.5" Later deeds have been held valid, but they can be dis-
tinguished as ratifications of earlier deeds issued for consideration.57
Some cases upholding the validity of those later deeds have not con-
sidered the sufficiency of consideration."
Promissory estoppel is often a factor in cases where deeds have been
conveyed for one dollar, just as in the analogous cases of credit advanced
on a guaranty. In situations where promissory estoppel principles have
been applied courts use language such as: "After the city had expended
its money on the faith of Mrs. Segar's consent she was estopped. . . .,"
or, "Moreover, the plaintiffs had erected a house on the lot at an expendi-
ture of several thousands of dollars." 60
Nominal consideration has been used in fact situations other than
property conveyance. Examples of such use include a release from tort
liability6 ' and an agreement to refrain from competing. "2 There also is a
dictum to the effect that one dollar would support a separation agree-
ment. " However, these cases were all decided on grounds other than
nominal consideration."
the rent to accrue therefrom . . . in good faith and for a valuable consideration,
from the same vendor or assignor, his distributees or devisees, and whose con-
veyance, contract or assignment is first duly recorded. (Emphasis added.)
55. Wisconsin River Land Co. v. Selover, 135 Wis. 594, 597, 116 N.W. 265, 267
(1908).
56. Ehrig v. Adams, 67 Okl. 157, 169 Pac. 645 (1918) ; Henley v. Davis, 57 Okl. 45,
156 Pac. 337 (1916).
57. See Henley v. Davis, supra note 56.
58. See Ehrig v. Adams, 67 Okl. 157, 169 Pac. 645 (1918).
59. Segars v. City of Cornelia, 60 Ga. App. 457, 4 S.E.2d 60, 63 (1939).
60. Appeal of Ferguson, 117 Pa. 426, 451, 11 Atl. 885, 887 (1888).
61. Killean v. Beaupre, 187 Ill. App. 407 (1914).
62. Nelson v. Woods, 205 Ga. 295, 53 S.E.2d 227 (1949).
63. Sloan v. Sloan, 66 A.2d 799 (Mun. Ct. App. D.C., 1949).
64. In Killean v. Beaupre, 187 Ill. App. 407 (1914), the release was under seal, and
the case was decided on that point.
A promisor did not contend that the nominal consideration of ten dollars was not
consideration in Nelson v. Woods, 205 Ga. 295, 53 S.E.2d 227 (1949). She contended
that she had never been paid the ten dollars.
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A case which possibly can be said"7 to support the Restatement in its
illustration of conveying Blackacre for one dollar is Thomas v. Thomas."
The promisee received a life estate in a dwelling house in return for 11
yearly rent and keeping the premises in good repair. 7 But even here
Lord Denman, C.J., stated that "the obligation to repair is one which
might impose charges heavier than the value of the life estate,"6 " while
Justice Patterson said that "the liability to repair is first created by this
instrument." 9
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AND THE BARGAIN-GIFT PROMISE
Although the Restatement (Second) appears to adopt the "bargained
for" test for consideration, a remnant of nominal consideration still seems
to remain. The remnant is found in the proposed comment c and illus-
tration 6 to section 75 which would enforce a promise involving a mix-
ture of bargain and gift even when both parties know that it is in part a
bargain and in part a gift. The reason given is the time-honored rule
that the court will not inquire into the adequacy of consideration.7" The
element of bargain may furnish the consideration for the entire transac-
tion.7 1 But when both parties know it is only in part a bargain, can it be
said that the other part was bargained for? If A gives B ten dollars for
a book worth only five dollars and both parties know that the extra five
dollars is a gift,72 that five dollars is not bargained for and seemingly
would not be enforced by the other requirements of the Restatement
(Second). If A offered to give 5,000 dollars for the five-dollar book and
there was a partial bargain shown, would there be sufficient reason to
enforce the promise as to the 4,995 dollar gift?
CONCLUSION
The tentative draft of the Restatement (Second) in refusing to en-
force a promise for nominal consideration receives at least partial support
from the academic world and strong support from case law. The
promise for one dollar finds case law support in a business transaction.
In Sloan v. Sloan, supra note 63, the dollar was exchanged for $2,250 and hence was
not enforced as the court could inquire into the adequacy of consideration in a money
for money exchange.
65. SIMPSON 85.
66. 2 Q.B. Rep. 851, 114 Eng. Rep. 330 (1842).
67. "Eleanor Thomas . . . shall . . . pay . . . 11. yearly . . . rent . . . and
shall keep the said dwelling house and premises in good and tenantable repair." Id. at
854, 114 Eng. Rep. at 332.
68. Id. at 859, 114 Eng. Rep. at 333.
69. Id. at 860, 114 Eng. Rep. at 334.
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 75, comment c.
71. Ibid.
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) § 75, illustration 6.
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But the business transaction involves a "bargain," other conideration
than the dollar, and a necessary reliance on the promise in a fast-moving
commercial world. Thus the business transaction is very easily dis-
tinguished from the conveyance of Blackacre for one dollar, which is
merely a formal expression for an essentially gratuitous transfer.
It should be noted that the authors of the tentative draft have not
seen fit to abolish all the legally operative effects of nominal considera-
tion since a mixture of bargain and gift remains enforceable under provi-
sions of the draft. However, if the Restatement (Second) is to be in-
ternally consistent, a mixture of bargain and gift should be enforced
only to the extent of the bargain.
Since nominal consideration lacks case law support, the Restatement
(Second) is on firm ground in omitting the Blackacre-for-a-dollar illus-
tration. If nominal consideration is to become recognized as a desirable
technique for supporting the principle of private autonomy, achieving
this recognition must be the task of those who would change rather than
those who restate the law."s
73. The current status of the Restatenent (Second) is shown by the following ex-
cerpt :
Contracts. While there will be no draft this year on Contracts, the Re-
porter has been making solid progress. The material approved by the Advisers
now extends through Section 174 of Chapter 7 and a further draft will be con-
sidered in the fall. We shall make up next year for the absence of a submis-
sion now.
ALI ANNUAL REPORT 10 (1966).
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